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CIVIL WAR AND THE (ALMOST) FORGOTTEN 
PACT OF BRUNDISIUM
Carsten Hjort Lange 
Aalborg University
lange@dps.aau.dk
This is an article about civil war; or, more precisely, an article on the impact 
of civil war on Roman society and Roman culture in general during the Late 
Republic, especially during the early days of the Triumvirate. It is also an article 
about those evolutions in political discourse which related to civil war, its 
justification and its ideology, during the period. Ancient civil war remains an 
insufficiently understood phenomenon. Only in recent years have scholars 
begun to fathom what civil war can tell us about the internal cohesion of ancient 
societies, about processes of identity formation, social conflict, disintegration 
and reintegration and so forth: in other words, its profound impact.1 
In a recent study Scheidel asks the fascinating question of how civil war 
affects inequality.2 Even though his question is of great interest, we should 
 1 On impact: Osgood 2006; 2014; Breed – Damon – Rossi 2010; Welch 2012; Wienand 
2012; Börm 2013; Börm – Mattheis – Wienand 2016; Eckert 2016; Havener 2016; Lange 
2016; Armitage 2017a; Ginsberg 2017; Ginsberg – Krasne 2018; Maschek 2018; Omissi 2018; 
Rosenblitt 2019; Lange – Vervaet 2019b. Some recent studies focus specifically on trauma, a 
psychological term: see Eckert 2016; Rosenblitt 2019. Rosenblitt 2019: 4: “Roman society 
never came to grips with the political and cultural trauma of the civil wars”. Undoubtedly the 
fear of civil war gripped Roman society, even during periods without civil war. The concept of 
“impact” adopted in this article is broader than that of “trauma” and includes not only the 
political machinations, but their broader packaging: language, ideologies, conceptual 
discourses, and so forth. It may perhaps more than anything help us realise that even if civil 
war is and was a terrible thing, it still needed to be talked about and justified. No wonder the 
civil war dynasts mostly focused on the positive outcome: the ending of civil war. 
 2 Scheidel 2017: 202.
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have serious concerns with his overall approach to civil war. According to 
Scheidel the American Civil War displayed many of the characteristics of 
large-scale interstate war, including massive mobilisation on both sides.3 He 
concludes that it is best seen as a hybrid.4 This rather bold conclusion leads 
him to identify the same hybridity in the Late Republican civil war(s). 
Notwithstanding their internal dimensions—a conflict among the aristocracy, 
triggered by competition—he identifies also key features of interstate war, 
such as a mass mobilisation and high participation rates.5 But this definition 
wrongly puts the cart before the horse. Why would we define the conflict that 
brought about the very concept of civil war, as well as many of its related 
conceptual discussions, as a hybrid, as the odd one out? If we look at the 
concept itself, surely the two civil wars – the Late Republican and the American 
– are two of only a handful examples of proper civil wars: they are wars (bella) 
fought between citizens (cives). This may after all be too extreme an approach; 
and too exclusive a definition denies many conflicts the name of civil war. We 
should furthermore remember that bellum does not necessarily mean 
conventional warfare between two large opposing armies, neither in an ancient 
nor in a modern context.6 Even so, to present the two examples as hybrids 
seems to me to misunderstand the concept and its historical context. What 
would we gain? It is of capital importance that all modern debates about civil 
war should rightfully take the Late Republic as their conceptual point of 
departure. Furthermore, as ancient historians we should not be over-influenced 
by modern definitions and approaches if these obscure the historical context 
of civil war.
1. Victory in Civil War 
To turn to the first of the key developments in the language and ideology 
of civil war in our period, one of the most pressing questions is the actual 
commemoration and celebration of victory over cives. The traditional Roman 
way of celebrating a military victory was the ritual of triumph, with a natural 
focus on victory itself. We may remember Polybius’ assessment of Roman 
 3 Scheidel 2017: 174-175.
 4 Scheidel 2017: 179, cf. 204: the American Civil War is treated as the equivalent to an 
interstate war.
 5 Scheidel 2017: 206.
 6 Lange 2017, also emphasising the connection between stasis and bellum civile.
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warfare at 1.37.7, where he writes that the Romans use violent force for all 
purposes. Warfare was a force for something good. But in a civil war context 
such celebrations became much more complex: internal war was never meant 
to happen in the first place. Having said that, none of the main protagonists 
of the civil wars of the Late Republic necessarily concealed their role in civil 
war—how would such a slight of hand have been possible? They instead 
changed their language and their justifications over time, and these changes 
are clearly visible in our evidence. 
Sulla, for example, celebrated his civil war victory as part of his triumph 
against Mithridates. The latter seems a conventional celebration of a clearly 
foreign war; but importantly, Pliny records that the second day of the 
triumph vaunted the gold and silver Marius the Younger had taken from 
Rome to Praeneste.7 Moreover, Plutarch tells us that Sulla’s triumphal 
celebration also included a number of former exiles.8 These facts complicate 
matters. The celebrations almost redefined the foreign war as a mixed 
conflict that also necessitated the destruction of internal Roman enemies. 
The triumph in this case symbolised the end of foreign war, but also 
indirectly the end of civil war.9 According to Sallust, (the appearance of ) 
concordia and pax was part of the ideology of the Sullan regime, both 
obviously connected to reconciliation after civil war.10 Concordia was of 
course already well-established in this game of civil war justification with 
Lucius Opimius in 121 BCE. The Temple of Concord celebrated his victory 
over the Gracchi—fellow Romans, but also seditious and potential tyrants.11 
Appian nicely sums up the situation:12 
καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς φόνοις ἐκάθαιρεν. ἡ δὲ βουλὴ καὶ νεὼν Ὁμονοίας αὐτὸν ἐν 
ἀγορᾷ προσέταξεν ἐγεῖραι.
A lustration of the city was performed for the bloodshed, and the Senate 
ordered the building of a temple to Concord in the forum. 
 7 Plin. HN 33.16
 8 Plut. Sull. 34.1. 
 9 Lange – Vervaet 2019a; Havener 2014: 167-169; Rosenblitt 2019: 13 is right to 
emphasise that “Sulla’s regime and its legacy were at the heart of the late republican collapse.”
10 Sall. Hist. frg. 49, Lepidus 24.
11 Plut. C. Gracch. 17 for the famous dictum of discord building a temple to concord; 
Cic. Sest. 140; August. De civ. D. 3.25; Pina Polo 2017: 13-14 and 19 on this as a monument 
to the tyrannicide.
12 App. B Civ. 1.26.
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A monument to civil war and stasis, no less! Thucydides talks of the change 
and degeneration of language during civil war.13 This is also the case at Rome. 
Seditio means revolt and rebellion, but also stasis.14 Similarly, hostis can signify 
anything from a foreign to an internal enemy, but at the same time an enemy 
that in principle no longer should be considered a citizen.15 The Romans begin 
to use the language of foreign war when describing and justifying their internal 
wars and civil wars (as with the triumph). The changing language of civil war 
evinces, therefore, a changing perception of the new normality.
Later, Caesar partly ‘externalised’ his civil war with Pompeius. We might 
argue (with Rosenblitt) that “the foreignization of civil wars played out in 
multiple ways in Rome after the Sullan traumas”;16 but there were usually 
multiple narratives, as this article hopes to show by focusing on one of the few 
exceptions. Caesar’s self-justification portrayed him forced into civil war by 
Romans behaving like barbarians—but he never claimed that it was not a civil 
war.17 An even more profound change happened in 44 BCE: a statue with a civic 
13 Thuc. 3.82.4 (with Spielberg 2017): καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα 
ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ 
προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ 
πᾶν ἀργόν· τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι 
ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος (“Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that 
which was given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal 
supporter; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for 
unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question incapacity to act on any. Frantic violence 
became the attribution of manliness; cautious plotting a justifiable means of self-defence”).
14 Lavan 2017: 21; Cic. Rep. 6.1.
15 From 88 BCE: Cic. Brut. 168; Liv. Per. 77; Vell. Pat. 2.19.1; Val. Max. 1.5.5; App. B 
Civ. 1.60 etc.; Rosenblitt 2019: 115 suggests that the term hostis refers to an external foe, but 
seems to underestimate the change in language; cf. 123: this goes back to 88 BCE; so already 
Lange 2016: esp. 103-105. Rosenblitt 2019: 59: “Tumultus points to a military crisis in the 
vicinity of Rome. ‘Tumultus Lepidi’ thus emphasizes the military danger and the Etrurian 
dimension to the crisis”. Be that as it may, the mere mention of the name of the enemy – 
Lepidus – naturally points towards an internal crisis. We should of course also remember the 
great flexibility of such concepts. When Cicero was trying hard to get the proconsul M. 
Antonius (cos. 44) declared a hostis publicus, he was strenuously opposed in this endeavour by 
L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 64), who insisted that the term bellum be replaced with tumultus (Phil. 
12.17): “I consistently called Antonius a public enemy (hostis), while others [L. Iulius Caesar] 
called him an adversary (adversarius); I consistently called this a war (bellum), while others 
called it a public emergency (tumultus).”
16 Rosenblitt 2019: 88. 
17 Caes. B Civ. 2.29.3 is the first mention of bellum civile; cf. 3.1.3; 1.67.3; 3.1.4; contra 
Grillo 2012: esp. 106-117.
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crown was set up on the Rostra to honour Caesar for ending the civil war.18 In a 
much more malicious manner, Caesar’s African triumph included depictions of 
the deaths of Scipio, Petreius, and Cato—even if no names were mentioned.19 
The balance between vengeance and spite vs. clementia and the end of civil war 
was always part of the reckoning. In this case Caesar’s actions resembled Sulla’s 
letter to the Senate in 85 BCE, announcing his imminent return and his intention 
to take vengeance on all those guilty on behalf of all those wronged and Rome 
itself.20 Similarly, we may recount the proscriptions and the severed (Roman) 
heads displayed on the Rostra.21 This extreme and conspicuous display of the 
punishment of (former) Romans was of course later reused by the Triumvirs. 
Having been victorious at Actium and Alexandria, Augustus famously 
claims in the Res Gestae that he had stopped this madness—that is, ended civil 
war: in consulatu sexto et septimo, postqua[m b]el[la ciuil]ia exstinxeram.22 His 
triumph over Antonius at Actium was the quintessential example of the 
blurring of foreign and civil war, but far subtler than Sulla’s. One example will 
suffice. After Actium, the slogan pax parta terra marique is also used on the 
Victory Monument at Actium/Nicopolis, emphasising that peace had been 
secured on land and sea. Deliberately, no enemy is mentioned, which in turn 
does point to a civil war.23 At the same time the monument was also part of 
the new policy of pax:24 peace after civil war. 
Whatever we make of this, all three dynasts have one thing in common: 
they fought what they themselves considered necessary civil wars, adding 
claims to a defensive and consequently a just position. Naturally these were 
civil wars ‘started by others’! Rome did not hide its empire nor its victories, not 
even its civil war victories. Sulla most likely even invented the concept of bellum 
civile. The fragments of his memoirs, cited in Plutarch’s Moralia, display a great 
historical example of vanity: Sulla portrayed the civil war as his greatest victory, 
a great war for a great general.25 Plutarch in the Moralia describes Sulla’s war as 
18 App. B Civ. 2.106; Dio Cass. 44.4.5.
19 App. B Civ. 2.101; Lange 2016: esp. 107-111.
20 App. B Civ. 1.77.
21 Lange 2020b.
22 RGDA 34.1.
23 Lange 2016: esp. chapter 6 for a more developed argument.
24 Cornwell 2017.
25 Plut. Mor. 786D-E = FRHist. II.22 [F26]: ὁ δὲ Σύλλας, ὅτε τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν καθήρας προσέμιξε τῇ Ῥώμῃ πρῶτον, οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ κατέδαρθεν, ὑπὸ γήθους 
καὶ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ὥσπερ πνεύματος ἀναφερόμενος τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὑτοῦ γέγραφεν 
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an ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος, giving his Greek equivalent for the Latin bellum civile.26 
By joining the dots between the case of Sulla and that of Augustus we can see 
how the language and ideology of civil war developed during the Late Republic. 
But what role did the Triumvirate play in this development? 
Having established the above framework, encompassing victory in civil 
war and its termination, the remainder of this article will place the Pact of 
Brundisium, including the subsequent joint ovation of Young Caesar and 
Antonius, within that framework. There are numerous ways of approaching 
the combatants during the civil war period in the aftermath of the death of 
Caesar, one being that of dynasts or factional leaders. The concept of “dynasts” 
seems in many ways a good approach, as it is central to the description of the 
period by our main sources. In Book 52 Cassius Dio famously emphasizes 
that in 29 BCE the Romans reverted to monarchical government: “Such were 
the achievements of the Romans and such their suffering under the kingship 
(basileia), under the Republic (demokratia), and under the dominion of a few 
(dynasteiai), during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years”.27 
56.37.1-7 includes a “list” of dynasts.28 The basic units of understanding are 
individual dynasts, fighting for supremacy with their networks of support; 
this points towards a balance of power game between the leading dynasts. Of 
course we cannot eliminate ideology from the Roman civil wars entirely. We 
should not, however, forget the multiple descriptions of human nature in civil 
war in the ancient evidence, including the role of un-ideological or extra-
ideological motivations for individuals joining a particular side.29
2. The Triumvirate
If we accept the concentration of the ancient evidence upon individuals, 
the Triumvirate becomes in essence the joining of factional leaders, or dynasts 
or stasiarchs. An alliance of dynasts tout court. Seneca nicely adds to this basic 
ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν (“as he entered Rome for the first time after cleansing Italy of its civil 
wars, Sulla did not sleep at all that night, borne up in his spirit by great joy and gladness, as 
by a wind’; he has written this about himself in his memoirs”)
26 See Lange – Vervaet 2019a for a more developed argument. 
27 Dio Cass. 52.1.1.
28 Cf. App. B Civ. 2.17, 19; see Lange 2019a; 2020a.
29 See for example Dio Cass. 37.55.2-3; 45.8.3-4; Christia 2012: 3: individuals and 
warring groups naturally aimed to emerge on the winning side.
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approach to the politics of the Late Republic: quid deficimus? et res publica suos 
triumviros habet (“Why do we lose heart? The republic too has its triumvirs 
[Brutus, Cassius and perhaps even Sextus Pompeius, although he changed 
sides at Misenum].”).30 It is fair to say that the different sides behaved in a 
similar fashion. The Triumvirate was an extraordinary command, which 
included some specific tasks.31 Appian writes:32
καινὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἐς διόρθωσιν τῶν ἐμφυλίων νομοθετηθῆναι Λεπίδῳ τε καὶ 
Ἀντωνίῳ καὶ Καίσαρι, ἣν ἐπὶ πενταετὲς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν, ἴσον ἰσχύουσαν ὑπάτοις·
that a new magistracy for setting straight the civil dissensions [= civil wars] 
should be created by law, which Lepidus, Antonius, and Caesar should hold for 
five years with consular power [trans. Welch 2019].
This quotation requires some explanation. Polybius 1.65.1-2 uses the 
concept of emphylios polemos to describe what was technically an “internal war” 
between Rome and the Falisci in 241 BCE. Appian however normally prefers 
ἐμφύλια to ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος.33 Appian thus unmistakably connects violence 
and stasis to polemos under the heading ἐμφύλιος.34 He shows that both are part 
of the same development—the essence of which is different degrees of 
violence—and thus that civil war is an integral part of the Emphylia. Following 
this logic, Appian may even have the civil wars begin in 133 BCE with the 
murder of Tiberius Gracchus.35 At the same time he marks the beginning of a 
new phase at 88 BCE.36 This turning point—including the sack of Rome—
opens up the final phase in stasis at Rome. From that point the stasiarchs fought 
one another with great armies in the fashion of war (πολέμου νόμῳ), and with 
the fatherland as their prize. This point is reiterated later:37 the battle between 
Marius and Sulla at Rome in 88 BCE was the first fought in the city not ὑπὸ 
εἰκόνι στάσεως (“in the guise of stasis”), but “unambiguously with bugle and 
standard, in the fashion of war” (ἀπροφασίστως ὑπὸ σάλπιγγι καὶ σημείοις, 
πολέμου νόμῳ). Cassius Dio’s interpretation is similar:38 initially civil strife was 
30 Sen. Suas. 6.11.
31 Vervaet 2014: 239-252; see Lange 2009: chapter 1 on its assignment.
32 App. B Civ. 4.2.6; for the language of stasis in Appian, see now Welch 2019
33 But see for example B Civ. 1.40; 2.103; 4.33; 5.28.
34 Cf. Lange 2017; Straumann 2017: 142-145; Welch 2019; contra Armitage 2017a: 35-58.
35 App. B Civ. 1.2.
36 App. B Civ. 1.55.
37 App. B Civ. 1.58.
38 Dio Cass. 52.16.2.
carsten hjort lange134
confined to political quarrels within the city, but later spread like a contagion 
into legions, then battlefields (“at first it was only at home and within our walls 
that we broke up into factions and quarrelled, but afterwards we even carried 
this plague out into the legions” (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἴκοι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους κατὰ 
συστάσεις ἐστασιάσαμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο 
προηγάγομεν)). The scale of fighting—albeit often blurred39—still emphasises 
that violence, civil strife and civil war are part of the same phenomenon. In 
Appian that is called “civil war”, or ἐμφύλια (see also below).
To return to the Triumvirate we have already mentioned the proscriptions, 
a Sullan measure.40 These were followed by the civil war against the murderers 
of Caesar: ἕν ἐστι λοιπὸν ἔτι ἔργον, στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέραν θαλάσσης 
αὐτόχειρας Γαΐου (“one task still remains, and that is to march against Caesar’s 
assassins beyond the sea”).41 It clearly comes across that the main assignment 
of the Triumvirate was to end the civil war(s) and consequently solidify the 
state: hence the title (tresvisi) rei publicae constituendae. This becomes even 
more evident—as the discussion below hopes to show—when reflecting on 
the Pact of Brundisium and its aftermath. 
3. Brundisium and Aftermath
After Philippi, many may have believed that the assignment of the Triumvirs 
was at an end. Yet it is at this point that Antonius “received” the (new) task of 
pacifying the East, while it fell to the lot of Young Caesar to neutralise Sextus 
Pompeius should he make a hostile move and to settle the veterans of the 
Triumvirs in Italy.42 These tasks were later restated in the Pact of Brundisium. 
Appian refers to the task of eliminating Sextus: “Young Caesar was to make war 
against Pompeius unless they should come to some arrangement, and Antonius 
was to make war against the Parthians to avenge their treachery toward Crassus” 
(πολεμεῖν δὲ Πομπηίῳ μὲν Καίσαρα, εἰ μή τι συμβαίνοι, Παρθυαίοις δὲ Ἀντώνιον, 
ἀμυνόμενον τῆς ἐς Κράσσον παρασπονδήσεως).43 
39 Lange 2017.
40 App. B Civ. 4.8-11 on the edict.
41 App. B Civ. 4.9.
42 Dio Cass. 48.2.2 [Sextus]; Dio Cass. 48.3.3-6 emphasises the panic in Italy caused 
by land distributions after Philippi; Suet. Aug. 13.3 [veterans].
43 App. B Civ. 5.65.
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The relationships between the Triumvirs had declined after Philippi. Even 
though Lucius Antonius survived the civil war-episode at Perusia, this will 
hardly have done much good for the relationship of the Triumvirs. In any case, 
Lucius Antonius had apparently been criticising the Triumvirs—especially 
Young Caesar as his opposite number—for not laying down their powers after 
the completion of their assignments.44 Following on from that, Young Caesar 
took over Gaul when Antonius’ man, the governor Calenus, died.45 This clearly 
suggests that the Triumvirs behaved like individual dynasts, maximising their 
own potential.46 Furthermore, it is fair to say that Young Caesar was not in 
control of affairs in Italy.47
To bring Sextus Pompeius more fully into focus: Appian suggests that the 
Triumvirs disagreed on what to do against him.48 Appian also suggests an early 
deal between Antonius and Sextus Pompeius.49 We may accept Appian’s 
narrative, but the shift in balance of power was brief indeed. Soon afterward 
it changed again, as Antonius decided to continue his arrangements with 
Young Caesar. Perhaps Antonius was using Sextus Pompieus in his own 
struggle. Cassius Dio sums it up as follows:50 
διὰ τε οὖν ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς φεύγοντας αὐτὸν ὑποδέχεσθαι τήν τε τοῦ 
Ἀντωνίου φιλίαν πράττειν καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας πολλὰ πορθεῖν, καταλλαγῆναί οἱ ὁ Καῖσαρ 
ἐπεθύμησε· διαμαρτὼν δὲ τούτου ἐκείνῳ μὲν Μᾶρκον Οὐιψάνιον Ἀγρίππαν πολεμῆσαι 
ἐκέλευσεν.
For these reasons, and because Sextus was harbouring the exiles, cultivating 
the friendship of Antonius, and plundering a great portion of Italy, Caesar desired 
to become reconciled with him; but when he failed of that, he ordered Marcus 
Vipsanius Agrippa to wage war against him.
Even if Dio refers to a potential deal between Antonius and Sextus, as 
also mentioned by Appian, both statements point towards a balance of power 
44 I.e. Philippi and defeating Caesar’s murderers: see App. B Civ. 5.19-20, 30, 39. For 
the context and war at Perusia, which takes up much of Appian’s book 5, see 5.14-49.
45 App. B Civ. 5.51; cf. 61; Dio Cass. 48.20.3-4.
46 See Christia 2012.
47 This may be a reason why we should believe the story of the Perusia killings, as an 
example of indiscriminate violence, possibly resulting from the lack of control Young Caesar 
had at this time in Italy; Lange 2020a.
48 App. B Civ. 5.61-62; cf. Suet. Aug. 13.3; Lange 2009: esp. 26-33.
49 App. B Civ. 5.54; in general see Welch 2012; 2019. 
50 Dio Cass. 48.20.1.
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game between the leading dynasts.51 This was indeed a tangled web. Under 
these extreme circumstances Antonius, logically, was ready to make a deal 
with Sextus should it be necessary.52
To bring other actors into focus, there is no denying that after the Perusine 
war Antonius arrived at Brundisium in 40 BCE to a Rome on the brink of 
another civil war, this time between the two Triumvirs. In the end their 
soldiers refused to fight.53 The ensuing settlement of Brundisium extended 
the Triumvirs’ assignment: the new task given to Young Caesar, as I mentioned 
earlier, was to deal with Sextus and thus to conclude the civil war.54 
More than anything the Brundisium Treaty seems to suggest that Antonius 
had accepted Sextus Pompeius as a problem and had decided that the alliance 
with Young Caesar was more important and (or) logical, even if he still wanted 
to include Sextus in a deal.55 Cassius Dio writes in Book 48 that “they 
accordingly divided the empire anew in this way and undertook in common 
the war against Sextus, although Antonius through messengers had taken oaths 
by which he had bound himself to Sextus against Caesar” (τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν 
οὕτως αὖθις διεδάσαντο, τὸν δὲ δὴ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Σέξτον ἐκοινώσαντο, 
καίτοι τοῦ Ἀντωνίου ὅρκους πρὸς αὐτὸν δι᾽ ἀγγέλων ἐπὶ τῷ Καίσαρι πεποιημένου).56 
This is again a description of the dealings of dynasts—and about the balance 
of power. At 48.30.4, Dio again mentions an agreement between Sextus and 
Antonius to make war on Young Caesar; but then realizing that this would 
never happen, Sextus once again raided Italy. Antonius was however right to 
include Sextus: the famine at Rome and the continued raids simply necessitated 
a deal. This was an unacceptable situation and in the end the Triumvirs were 
forced to cut a deal with him.57 There can be no doubt that in 39 BCE, Sextus 
Pompeius was more than ready to do so: Welch is right to suggest that 
compromise was a necessity in the stasiotic politics of this period.58 The 
Misenum Treaty was cynical insofar as it was a necessary deal for all parties.59 
51 Dio Cass. 48.29.1.
52 Cf. Osgood 2006: 187.
53 App. B Civ. 5.64.
54 App. B Civ. 5.65; Dio Cass. 48.28.4; Lange 2009: esp. 29-33.
55 App. B Civ. 5.65.
56 Dio Cass. 48.29.1.
57 Dio Cass. 48.31.4.
58 Welch 2012: 53.
59 Contra Welch 2012: 238.
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There was an amnesty after the murder of Caesar and again at the Treaty of 
Misenum for those who had opposed the Triumvirs and Young Caesar.60 
The Brundisium incident was typical inasmuch as the dealings of the 
dynasts with each other are concerned, but atypical inasmuch as the Triumvirs 
were fighting it out amongst themselves. The question remains of what 
actually happened. Welch suggests that Antonius made a deal with Sextus 
Pompeius and consequently there was open conflict with Young Caesar.61 
This needs however to be incorporated into the narrative of the soldiers 
refusing to fight as well as the assignment of the Triumvirate. Either the 
Triumvirs tried to sell the idea that there was no civil war; or, alternatively, 
there never actually was, meaning that the fighting was not deemed to be 
quite a bellum. Whatever the case, looking at the list of civil wars as presented 
by Suetonius, Brundisium seems to have been sold as a non-war. Officially at 
least, no civil war ever happened!62
To delve a little further into our main historical narratives, Appian’s 
emphasis, as already mentioned, centres around the dynasts. B Civ. 5.55 refers 
to an agreement between Ahenobarbus and Antonius (later to change sides to 
Young Caesar just before Actium). This becomes an issue when they arrive at 
Brundisium, as the gates are closed. The reason given is the enemy 
Ahenobarbus. Antonius lays siege to the city and instructs Sextus to raid 
Italy.63 We are closing in on a conflict between the two Triumvirs. Appian 
claims that the soldiers of Young Caesar knew this, and were planning and 
hoping to prevent it; if not, there would be war.64 One of the reasons cited for 
Antonius’ mere arrival in Italy is the army of Calenus (see above). This is 
about the balance of power. Sextus’ attack on Southern Italy was however 
repelled by Agrippa.65 In the end the death of Fulvia allegedly helped to solve 
60 Vell. Pat. 2.77.3; Tac. Ann. 5.1; Suet. Tib. 5.1.
61 Welch 2019; Dio Cass. 48.27; open warfare: 48.28.2; see below.
62 Suet. Aug. 9.1: bella civilia quinque gessit: Mutinense, Philippense, Perusinum, Siculum, 
Actiacum; e quibus primum ac novissimum adversus M. Antonium, secundum adversus Brutum 
et Cassium, tertium adversus L. Antonium triumviri fratrem, quartum adversus Sextum 
Pompeium Cn. filium (“The civil wars which he waged were five, called by the names of 
Mutina, Philippi, Perusia, Sicily, and Actium; the first and the last of these were against 
Marcus Antonius, the second against Brutus and Cassius, the third against Lucius Antonius, 
brother of the Triumvir, and the fourth against Sextus Pompeius, son of Gnaeus”).
63 App. B Civ. 5.56. 
64 App. B Civ. 5.57.
65 App. B Civ. 5.58.
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matters. Reconciliation followed rather than full-blown civil war: Antonius 
orders Sextus back to Sicily, and a new deal between the Triumvirs is struck.66 
In this case Antonius is emphasised as the main strategist, understanding that 
a deal with Sextus Pompeius would be necessary to stop the raids and the 
famine in Rome.67 Initially Young Caesar disagrees, but this clearly points 
towards the Misenum deal. 
Cassius Dio also emphasises the great game of dynasts. Antonius´ siege of 
Brundisium was the direct result of a deal with Sextus, consequently making 
Young Caesar his enemy.68 All things considered this seems a little simplistic. 
Initially Dio suggests that there was in fact outright war between the 
Triumvirs:69 “The two leaders thus broke out into open war and were sending 
messages to the various cities and to the veterans, wherever they thought they 
could get any aid; and all Italy was again thrown into turmoil, especially 
Rome, and some were already choosing one side or the other, and others were 
hesitating. While the leaders themselves and those who were to assist them in 
the war were in a state of suspense, Fulvia died in Sicyon, where she had been 
staying” (συνερρωγότων τε οὖν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ διαπεμπόντων πρός τε 
τὰς πόλεις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐστρατευμένους, ὁπόθεν τινὰ ὠφελίαν προσλήψεσθαι 
ἐνόμιζον, ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἰταλία αὖθις ἐταράσσετο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη ὅτι μάλιστα, καὶ οἱ μὲν 
ἤδη πρὸς ἑκάτερον μεθίσταντο, οἱ δὲ ἔμελλον. μετεώρων δὲ αὐτῶν τε ἐκείνων καὶ 
τῶν συμπολεμησόντων σφίσιν ὄντων, ἡ Φουλουία ἐν Σικυῶνι, ἐν ᾗ ἦν, 
ἐτελεύτησε). The war between the Triumvirs is clearly marked out as a 
polemos.70 The death of the warmonger Fulvia is again given as a reason or 
pretext for reconciliation. Without going into detail about the potential 
sources used by Appian and Cassius Dio, the negative role played by Fulvia 
– an obstacle – is part of the Livian tradition.71 A new arrangement is struck. 
Sextus is the new enemy, even if Antonius had previously held a deal with 
him. Dio sums up this conflict as follows, viewing civil war through the lens 
of human nature:72 
66 App. B Civ. 5.63-65; agreement: marriage between Antonius and Octavia.
67 App. B Civ. 5.65.
68 Dio Cass. 48.27.5.
69 Dio Cass. 48.28.2-3.
70 Vell. Pat. 2.76.3 talks of fear, metus, of war before describing the peace arrangement 
at Brundisium.
71 Liv. Per. 127: bellum adversus Caesarem.
72 Dio Cass. 48.29.3.
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τοσοῦτος μὲν δὴ καὶ τῶν στάσεων καὶ τῶν πολέμων παράλογός ἐστι, δίκῃ μὲν 
οὐδὲν τῶν τὰ πράγματα ἐχόντων νομιζόντων, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τάς τε ἀεὶ χρείας καὶ τὰ 
συμφέροντά σφων τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον ἐξεταζόντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς 
αὐτοὺςτοτὲ μὲν ἐχθροὺς τοτὲ δὲ ἐπιτηδείους σφίσι πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἡγουμένων.
So great, indeed, is the perversity that reigns in factional strife and war; for 
men in power take no account of justice, but determine on friend and foe 
according as their own interests and advantage at the time dictate, and accordingly 
they regard the same men, now as their enemies, now as their friends, according 
to the occasion.
There follows a section pointing towards the Misenum treaty and later 
war with Sextus Pompeius. But again it must be remembered that – 
according to Dio – after Perusia, Young Caesar had wanted to reconcile 
himself with Sextus.73 This failed.74 Dio may even be suggesting that even 
after the Pact of Brundisium, Antonius was still negotiating with Sextus. 
Whatever the case, two basic lessons can be learned. This is about dynasts 
– including Sextus Pompeius – and their wish to place themselves in the 
best possible position. This also explains the second point, giving insight 
into the Triumviral period more broadly: how a war ends may explain why 
the next begins. The Brundisium affair seems partly a continuation of 
issues between the two main Triumvirs: the issues at Perusia and the 
disagreement regarding Sextus; in general the question of how to move 
forward and accomplish the assignment of the Triumvirate. The wars are 
seen as personal wars between dynasts. In both sources this provides us 
with a take on human nature, explaining how human nature affects civil 
war and vice versa. 
4. Honours
The aftermath of the Pact of Brundisium presents further peculiarities. 
The honours given to the two Triumvirs after the pact at first appear 
problematic to say the least; but are they? Cassius Dio is certainly reserved: 
the “victors” moved across the pomerium in triumphal dress and on 
horseback “as if at a triumph” (ἐν δ᾽ οὖν τῷ τότε ἐπί τε ἵππων αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ἐν 
ἐπινικίοις τισὶν ἐσαγαγόντες).75 The joint ovation is mentioned on the Fasti 
73 Dio Cass. 48.20.1.
74 The basic differences between Appian and Dio are outlined by Gowing 1992: 187-189.
75 Dio Cass. 48.31.3.
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Triumphales and consequently officially recognised as a triumph in 
Augustan times, but in Dio’s mind this was not a real ovation. 
The Fasti Triumphales entry for the joint ovation of 40 BCE is 
revealing: Imp. Caesar Divi f. C. f. IIIvir r(ei) p(ublicae) c(onstituendae) 
ov[ans, an. DCCXIII] quod pacem cum M. Antonio fecit [–––] (“40 BCE: 
While Imp. Caesar Divi f. C. f. IIIvir r p c celebrated an ovation because 
he made peace with Antonius”).76 Antonius is likewise recorded because he 
made pacem cum Imp. Caesare. There is neither foreign nor civil enemy, 
but an ovation was granted because the two Triumvirs made peace with 
one other. In isolation each of these two entries would be strange, but 
taken together they can only suggest one thing: the Triumvirs were granted 
this honour for not starting a civil war, or alternatively, for ending a civil 
war; which of the two we choose depends on what we think happened at 
Brundisium. It may even have indirectly included Perusia, but in principle 
– to focus only on the inscription – this was solely about the two Triumvirs 
and their ceremonial entry in ovation. An ovation in continuation of the 
Pact of Brundisium. Having said that, this was evidently not a traditional 
victory celebration. No enemy was mentioned: merely the fact of peace 
(or, significantly, the absence of civil war). This was a celebration of the 
inner logic of the Triumvirate. We should note also that both entries 
naturally include the title of ‘Triumvir’. This was about securing peace 
after civil war (assuming that one was confessedly declared; it is noteworthy 
that there was no celebration after Philippi) and about constituting the 
state. Both of these components encompass the assignment of the 
Triumvirate. This celebration also happened not because of victory itself 
but the absence of a conflict that could lead to one; this is revealing of the 
shifting ideologies of civil war in the Late Republic. 
Again, there is more information to be added to this enquiry. The 
joint ovation can hardly suggest that the assignment of the Triumvirate 
had been accomplished; for a start, the issue of Sextus Pompeius was still 
in the balance. But this was a turning point in the scale of that balance: the 
Triumvirs were again working jointly for the constituting of the res publica. 
The Triumvirs will no doubt have thought such a statement politic in the 
wake of Perusia, Brundisium, and all the rest. This was a sign of unity! A 
sign of unity, but using, importantly, the distinctive language of the 
76 Degrassi 1947: 86-87, 568, cf. 342-343, Fasti Barberiniani.
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Triumvirate: pax, certainly, and possibly with an indirect emphasis on the 
ending of civil war, or a phase of it. This idea of phases is clearly visible after 
Actium.77 The civil war did not have to be mentioned, but was there for all 
to see. This was symbolic and emphasised the end of civil war: retrospectively, 
looking perhaps back before Brundisium; and prospectively, looking 
forward to the at least temporary prevention of further conflict, for example 
Brundisium and Sextus Pompeius. 
In 2016 I suggested two basic approaches to the joint ovation of 40 
BCE:78 first, an emphasis on avoiding civil war; and secondly, the ending 
of civil war and ceremonial entry. The two can easily be combined. This 
was a new kind of celebration. It was one of many innovations in the 
language and ideology of civil war: note, for example, that Caesar’s ovation 
of 44 BCE was held without reference to a prior war, victory, or even 
enemy.79 In a development of this approach, the ovation of Young Caesar 
and Antonius was a celebration for the peaceful outcome of the difficulties 
at Brundisium. The Fasti Triumphales is proof of these difficulties of the 
Triumvirate around 40 BCE. Importantly, the Fasti were never 
retrospectively changed and the entries survive. But surely this is much 
more than a ceremonial entry. The two narratives combined suggest that 
the absence of civil war was vital. This may partly be the precursor of the 
Parthian Settlement of 20 BCE: a diplomatic concord as opposed to civil 
war.80 The marriage between Antonius and Octavia was publicly staged in 
Rome, immediately following the entry into the city of Antonius and 
Young Caesar in triumphal dress, on horseback. That the Senate had to 
allow Octavia an exemption from the ten-month waiting period following 
Marcellus’ death shows this was very much a matter of public concern.81 
The Triumvirs were certainly willing to take traditions to their limits and 
beyond, but as a statement of reconciliation – especially toward their 
77 Cf. the inscription of the victory monument at Actium; see Lange 2016: 142-143; 
Actium as a war, not just a battle; Lange 2009: 73-93.
78 Lange 2016: 114-115, 157-158; 114: avoiding civil war.
79 Degrassi 1947: 86-87, 567.
80 Cf. Cic. Phil. 5.40-41 mentions a proposal made to honour Lepidus because he 
avoided civil war with Sextus Pompeius in 44 BCE.
81 See Plut. Ant. 31; App. B Civ. 5.64; Dio Cass. 48.31.3; Osgood forthcoming 
emphasises that although men had political power, women worked effectively within that 
system, and could take the initiative; Sumi 2005 on ceremony and power in the outgoing 
Republic.
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soldiers – as well as a way of turning the difficult period of the Triumvirate 
into a symbol of how dramatically affairs had improved under their 
leadership. Peace was secured. There seems to be an inner logic to this. 
Where does this leave us? The policy of peace and end of civil war 
emphasised by Young Caesar/Augustus goes not only back to Caesar (see 
above), but was jointly created – or so we may assume – with his fellow 
Triumvir Marcus Antonius. It derives from the Triumvirate and in 40 BCE 
we see a slightly underdeveloped approach, one to be perfected over the 
years to come. There are two basic possibilities. First, at this early stage the 
ideology of pax had not yet developed into a subtle, bifurcated approach 
emphasising both a foreign-war victory and the ending of civil war. The 
emergence of those two related narratives would come later. Secondly, this 
was not Sicily nor North-western Greece: this was Italy. Furthermore, the 
Triumviral assignment of ending the civil war was logically not aimed at 
the Triumvir’s internal struggle. After Brundisium there was one narrative 
– peace between the Triumvirs, whatever context we provide for this 
information – while later, there were two distinct but non-conflicting 
narratives. 
Take the victory over Sextus Pompeius: the Res Gestae refer to Sextus 
Pompeius as a pirate, and in this connection mention slaves.82 This is 
supported by two letters from 36 BCE written by Young Caesar which 
accuse Sextus Pompeius of encouraging piracy.83 The piracy narrative was 
not developed late and retrospectively.84 The narrative concerning the 
ending of civil war is also found in 36 BCE: Young Caesar was given an 
honorific column on the Forum, adorned with rostra, a golden statue, and 
an inscription: “Peace, long disrupted by civil war, he restored on land and 
sea” (τὴν εἰρήνην ἐστασιασμένην ἐκ πολλοῦ συνέστησε κατά τε γῆν καὶ 
θάλασσαν).85 Welch has pointed to the fact that Appian writes τοῦτο μὲν δὴ 
τῶν τότε στάσεων ἐδόκει τέλος εἶναι (“This seemed to be the end of staseis”).86 
82 Chapter 25; cf. RGDA 27.3 on the servile war.
83 App. B Civ. 5.77, 80; cf. Hor. Epod. 9, 9-10, fighting a slave war.
84 Contra Welch 2012: 10, cf. 278-279.
85 App. B Civ. 5.130; cf. RGDA 25.1. The context of 5.130 and 5.132 suggests “civil 
war”; Appian (B Civ. 5.132) uses the word stasis – clearly referring back to the inscription – to 
describe the end of civil war. What would be Latin have been? Surely bellum civile. See also 
Welch 2019.
86 Welch 2019; App. B Civ. 5.132.
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There was no end of civil war. But whereas that was the end goal, it was an 
assignment in different phases. The Res Gestae 13 mentions three decreed 
closings of the Temple of Janus: pax by degrees. Peace was not a constant, 
at least not until Actium and Alexandria were secured. 
The campaign that ended at Actium was declared outright against 
Cleopatra in 32 BCE, but later turned into a civil war when she received 
help from Antonius.87 Again Young Caesar could claim to end the civil 
war(s), and again a civil war started again by his opponent.88 The slogan 
pax parta terra marique – prominently used in 36 BCE, which Appian 
renders into Greek – is connected by several Latin authors to Augustus’ 
closure of the Temple of Janus as well as to his peaceful settlement after the 
civil war against Antonius. This is clearly reflected by Livy, who writes of a 
period “after the battle of Actium, when the emperor Caesar Augustus had 
brought about peace on land and sea” (post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore 
Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta).89 In remarkably similar fashion, 
Suetonius writes that Augustus “closed three times the temple of Janus 
Quirinus, which had been closed but twice before his time since the 
founding of the city, in a far shorter period, having won peace on land and 
sea” (Ianum Quirinum semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam 
suam clausum in multo breviore temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter 
clusit).90 The slogan pace parta terra marique is also used on the Victory 
Monument at Actium, emphasising that peace had been secured on land 
and sea. No enemy is mentioned, which in turn does point to a civil war.91 
Augustus’ in the Res Gestae boasts to have ended bella terra et mari civilia 
externaque.92
5. Civil War(s) as Exempla
In a Roman context exempla often denotes the citation of exemplary 
figures of the past, distinguished by their great services to the res publica. In 
87 Lange 2009; 2016.
88 RGDA 34.1; see above.
89 Liv. 1.19; cf. 30.45.1; Laudatio Turiae 2.25; Sen. de Clementia 1.9.4; Apocolocyntosis 
10.2.
90 Suet. Aug. 22.
91 Lange 2016: chapter 6.
92 RGDA 13; 3.1, 4.2.
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the words of Roller, they are rhetorical devices that effectuate persuasion.93 
Deeds or actions were also memorialised by monuments.94 After the victory 
over Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE at Naulochus, the Senate and Young Caesar 
naturally turned to Duilius as the model victor at Mylae.95 The honorific 
statue on a columna rostrata was copied in 36 BCE (see above). Duilius was 
the first Roman to fight and win a major sea battle. Roller emphasises that 
“[B]y appropriating the iconography of a monument commemorating a 
famous victory over a feared external enemy, he paraded his own victory, 
actually won in civil war, as being a proper victory over foreigners – or at least 
he conveniently elided the distinction between civil and external war”.96 But 
Young Caesar did in fact no such thing! Certainly it is obvious that he was 
appropriating the great victor, but at the same time the inscription of the 
rostral monument makes clear that this was set up as an honour for the civil 
war victor, for the victor who had ended civil war. The victor had two non-
conflicting narratives.
This suggests that for Young Caesar it was vital to commemorate his 
victories in a traditional manner, while at the same time not forgetting the 
sole basis for his political legitimacy, namely the Triumviral assignment. This 
was a civil war monument, one set up as an honour in 36 BCE. This is about 
commemoration, but also about legitimising a civil war. This is political 
initiative in times of civil war, using Duilius as an exemplum. This was after all 
not just a civil war, this was a victory in war against the enemies of Rome. 
Here we return, full circle, to Sulla: a great war to suit a great general. This is 
why the Romans kept using the language of foreign war when describing civil 
war, naturally developing and changing it over time. It is also about what 
Roller describes as “a degree of moral change”.97 A moral change where the 
emphasis placed upon civil war ceases merely to focus on its horrors, and 
rather refashions it into a narrative of the positive outcome of victory. Civil 
war, therefore, is re-established as a (“positive”) exemplum. 
93 Roller 2018: 1.
94 Roller 2018: 6.
95 Roller 2018: 134-162; Kondratieff 2004.
96 Roller 2018: 150; cf. Bleckmann 2002: 121: “Details wurden bewußt vermieden, um 
nicht an den Umstand erinnern zu müssen, daß der Sieg gegen Sextus Pompeius in einem 
Bürgerkrieg errungen worden war.”
97 Roller 2018: 163, regarding Fabius Cunctator.
civil war and the (almost) forgotten pact of brundisium 145
Cicero famously uses negative historical exempla in the Philippics.98 
Reflecting on Mutina and a potential declaration of Antonius as hostis, Cicero 
mentions Romans who wanted civil war: L. Cornelius Sulla, C. Marius, Cn. 
Octavius, L. Cornelius Cinna, C. Marius the Younger and Cn. Papirius Carbo. 
Yet it is precisely these figures, especially the likes of Sulla, Caesar, and Young 
Caesar, who tried to create their own counter-exempla, both in their writings as 
well as in the honours awarded to them, and the ideologies that both conveyed.
As for the joint ovation of 40 BCE, it is hardly a surprise that Antonius 
and Young Caesar decided to use the language of the Triumvirate when 
commemorating their internal struggle—one that almost came to a premature 
blow. When the blow finally came, Young Caesar still decided to use the same 
language of reconciliation, of peace after civil war. At the same time the 
foreign-war card was naturally played and the war was declared on Cleopatra. 
They were two non-conflicting narratives. The Triumvirate was rightly at the 
centre of attention during this civil war period. The recurring aspect of civil 
war, as we have seen, involved also recurring debates and recurring levels of 
justification. Here, as ever, Thucydides is the great teacher: civil strife inflicted 
many a terrible blow, as it always does, and always will, while human nature 
remains the same.99 This article has tried to place Brundisium within a series 
of different attempts to figure out how to end civil war. In the end the Pact of 
Brundisium was a very ‘Caesarian’ moment: they should not be fighting and 
the veterans did not want them fighting. The joint ovation of 40 BCE may 
have aimed to give the hopeful impression of breaking that cycle; but whether 
its audience was convinced is anyone’s guess. 
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